THE MODEL
Consider the idealized problem of a consumer who receives a stationary income over time and uses it in each period to buy two goods, one of which is a drug of unknown quality. The other good can be interpreted as a composite good which provides fixed proportions of all other commodities.
We let Yt = drug consumption in period t, and xt = consumption of the other good in period t. The consumer's periodic income is I>0. Prices are normalized so that the price per unit of the composite good is 1. The per unit price of the drug is p-> 0.
The fact that drug quality is unknown is assumed to imply that the consumer views the effect of drug consumption on health as a random, but non-cumulative relationship. Specifically, it is assumed that health in period t can be measured by a variable zt which is related to drug consumption in period t by the linear equation 2t = a + lRYt +9t where {et} is a sequence of intertemporarily independent and unobserved normal random variables each, with mean zero, and variance one. (In this equation, as in the remainder of the paper, random variables are denoted by a ".. ".) This specification implies that random variations in health are unrelated to drug intake and occur even if the consumer abstains from drug use. Without drug use, health is measured by cx + t which is a normal random variable with mean cx and variance 1. It is plausible to assume that the consumer knows the distribution of health when no drugs are used. Thus he is assumed to know his " average health" parameter a and the variance of st which, for convenience, we assume to be 1.
The parameter f, is the contribution of each unit of drug consumption to health. This parameter measures drug quality and is unknown. The consumer has beliefs about the true value of fi which change from period to period as experience with the drug accumulates.
These beliefs are assumed to be represented by a probability distribution, which is revised in each period as information is received. We assume that there are n numbers which could possibly be the true value of fi. That is, there exists a set {f1, fl2, ..., fl&} of possible fi values each of which has positive probability in the " prior " probability distribution that represents the consumer's initial beliefs. This assumption is made strictly for expositional convenience. The results obtained hold for a more general class of prior measures which are concentrated on a compact set. We will return to this point several times in the exposition which follows.
It is hypothesized that the consumer behaves as though he were a Bayesian statistician who uses Bayes' Rule to revise his expectations when new information is received. If the consumer buys yi units of the drug in period i and observes a health level zi in that period, then his experience in period i is summarized by the vector wi = (zr, yi). If we let ft be the probability that fl = f3i given the information available at time t, and let In making his drug and goods purchase decision in each period the consumer is assumed to maximize expected utility. In period t, the utility of (xt, zt) is u(xt, zt), where u is a strictly concave utility function with positive marginal utility of both goods. Since the utility function u is invariant over time, the consumer's preferences for health and other goods are stationary. In spite of this stationarity, the consumer's preferences for drugs and goods are not invariant over time. These preferences are represented by an expected utility function that varies with beliefs formed on the basis of experience. In period t, this expected utility function is In each period t, the consumer can, therefore, be viewed as choosing Yt, and setting Xt = I-PYt. The Yt level chosen must, of course, satisfy the restriction 0 < Yt < (/p).
...(3)
In addition, the Yt choice will be influenced by wt 1, the experience accumulated to time t.
Expected utility at time t, U(I-Pyt, Yt I ft) is influenced by current beliefs as represented by ft. But ft = gt(f ' wt 1), where wt-= (zt -1, yt-1) This means that the process of information assimilation, captured in the function gt, introduces an intertemporal element to the problem of choosing an optimal drug purchase. Intuitively, the beliefs which provide the basis for preference formation in period t are arrived at by interpreting previously observed health levels zt-1 in the light of earlier drug consumption choices y . In particular, earlier drug consumption levels determine the extent to which observed health levels can be relied on as evidence about ,B. The consumer's problem, then, is to choose a level of drug demand which attains an optimal balance between informational gains that accrue later and current health gains. A maximizer, which may not be unique, is denoted by yT(f).
Lemma 3 below will demonstrate that yT(f) exists by establishing that the function in (9) is continuous.
The experimental design aspects of the consumer's choice problem are apparent in (5) and its alternative expression (9). The first term in (5) and (9) measures the present utility of y units of drug consumption. The second term measures the expected future utility of the improvements in information made possible because y was chosen. In choosing yT(f) to maximize the sum of these utilities the consumer is, as stated above, arriving at an optimal balance between present utility and future information.
As we are interested in the effect of experimentation on consumption we propose to investigate the relationship between the (possibly non-unique) strategy yT(f) and the consumption strategy which would be optimal if the possibilities for learning from experience are non-existent or ignored. To facilitate this comparison we first study the optimal consumption decisions made by a consumer who assumes that his future beliefs will be unchanged by his current experience. Such a consumer will choose a sequence of drug consumption levels to solve the problem max El The value y which maximizes (11), is denoted by y?(f), and is called the optimal nonexperimental consumption policy. Under our assumptions y?(f) is unique. To emphasize the difference between y?(f) and yT(f) recall that, from (9), the function which yT(f) maximizes is a sum of two terms. The first term represents expected current utility, while the second term measures the extent to which learning from current experience enables the consumer to increase his utility by making more informed future decisions. If we compare (9) with (11), it is seen that (11) is the first term in (9), i.e. (11) is the current expected utility of consumption. Thus y?(f), unlike yT(f), is chosen without regard to the effects of learning from experience.
Since zt observations provide information about , when Yt is positive, the consumer can, in essence, produce information by consuming drugs. The " amount " of information he produces will depend on the amount of drugs he consumes. This relationship between information and drug consumption can be interpreted as a technology for information production in which the " input " is Yt. The " output " (measured in expected utility terms) can be interpreted as 3HT It is obvious and easy to prove that joint observation of both independent variables r' and r" is sufficient for observations of the single variable r. It is also relatively easy to demonstrate that the random variable 
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For most of the following discussion we will suppress the dependence of FT The above notation can now be used to prove the following lemma, from which the main theorem can be proved immediately. Again it should be emphasized that the proof does not depend crucially on the assumption of a discrete prior. 
MONOPOLISTS WHO EXPERIMENT TO LEARN THEIR DEMAND CURVES:
A REINTERPRETATION
The statistical model described and the theorems proved above can be reinterpreted to analyse experimental behaviour on the part of a monopolist who does not know the slope of his demand curve. In carrying out this reinterpretation, the monopolist can be viewed as choosing either price or quantity. If price is chosen, a stochastic demand curve determines the demand which that price calls forth. When quantity is chosen, the price at which that quantity can be sold is determined by the stochastic demand curve. Interestingly, the conclusions obtained in these two alternative interpretations appear to be contradictory. But as we shall show these interpretations are based on different statistical models, so the paradox is indeed only apparent. and apply Lemma 2 to prove Theorems 1 and 2. Theorem 2 asserts that the experimenting monopolist never chooses to supply less than the non-experimenting monopolist. As a result, the average price, cX +flyT(f), paid to an experimenting monopolist will be lower than a +,Byo(f), the average price paid in markets supplied by a non-experimenting monopolist.
If price is the decision variable, then zt = the demand at time t, and Yt = the price at time t. With this reinterpretation, the demand curve is (33). Again the set of f's which occur with positive probability is assumed to contain only negative numbers. In this case profit at time t is Ytzt -c(zt).
As above, the utility function, Pi, is assumed to be strictly concave and exhibit a positive marginal utility of income. The utility of profit used in computing (4) We have just shown that (33) implies a higher average price with experimentation than without. However, since the variance of (st/fl) = (I /f2), and / is unknown, the demand curve (35) fails to satisfy the assumptions which led us to the conclusion that the experimental price exceeds the non-experimental price.
CONCLUSIONS
Uncertainty is pervasive, but it can be reduced at a cost. Rather than assuming some ad-hoc cost of information we have modelled a process of endogenous information generation. The cost of information turns out to be the utility that must be foregone by the choice of a larger control variable than would be optimal given current information and ignoring experimentation. This model provides a statistical foundation for the ad-hoc process which Arrow assumed and called " learning by doing ". The model is also consistent with the empirical observations which motivated his paper: that productivity increases with experience. This happens in our model of the consumer because more informed consumers choose better combinations of risky drugs and non-risky goods for consumption. The model in this paper is one of intertemporal optimization for a consumer who takes prices as given. Grossman [6] and [7] analysed a competitive equilibrium model of a market where firms are uncertain about the productivity of an input. In the context of a rational expectations model he derived an algorithm which could be used to characterize the path of equilibrium price random variables as well as the optimal input policy for firms. An equilibrium version of our model could similarly be analysed using Grossman's approach. This is left for future work. 
